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ABSTRACT
Efficiently handling reputation is important in dealing with
free-riding, malicious attacks and random failures in self-
organized communication systems. At the same time, work
in this context is often found to be relevant in many other
disciplines, in particular the social sciences. A number of
distributed reputation systems have been proposed and an-
alyzed, although research has not been very coherent. In this
paper, for the first time, we provide an overview of the state-
of-the-art in the various computer science communities as
well as the social sciences. In particular, we present results
obtained from our mathematical model devised to investi-
gate the impact of liars on their peers’ reputation about a
subject. We find that liars have no impact unless their num-
ber exceeds a certain threshold (phase transition). We give
precise formulae and quantify the impact, thereby providing
insight into fundamental questions in social networks as well
as facilitating performance evaluation and optimization of
distributed reputation systems in communication networks.
We conclude by suggesting fundamental directions for future
research into reputation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.1 [Computer-communication networks]: Network
architecture and design—Distributed networks; D.2.4 [Com-
puter-communication networks]: Distributed systems—
Distributed applications; I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial In-
telligence]: Multiagent systems, Intelligent agents; J.4 [So-
cial and behavioral sciences]: Sociology, Economics; C.4
[Performance of systems]: Modelling techniques, per-
formance attributes; G.3 [Probability and Statistics]:
Markov processes, stochastic processes
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1. INTRODUCTION
Self-organized computer and communication systems have
received increasing attention over the last few years, in terms
of both deployment and research. They are typically orga-
nized according to the peer-to-peer (P2P) organization prin-
ciple. That is, participants in the system are equals in that
they have equivalent capabilities and responsibilities – they
are peers. Such P2P systems can also be found in a vari-
ety of other networks, such as social or biological networks.
Thus it is not surprising that there is a wealth of problems
that is also of interest in other disciplines.
One of the major problems in self-organized communication
systems is that of cooperation. Typically, users are con-
cerned primarily about their own benefits and thus coop-
eration and fairness cannot be guaranteed. This selfish be-
haviour is called free-riding and is a well-known phenomenon
in economics. Malicious attacks and random failures are
other important problems. A promising approach to all of
these is that of using reputation systems.
Reputation itself has been considered in many disciplines
other than computer and communication science, includ-
ing economics, sociology, psychology, management science
as well as marketing. For a number of broad-ranging stud-
ies on reputation the reader is referred to [35].
In computer science, the idea is comparatively new. How-
ever, with the increasing popularity of self-organized com-
munication systems, distributed reputation systems in par-
ticular have received increasing attention in the last few
years. Even within computer science research activities have
not been very coherent, though, and have almost evolved
separately in the artificial intelligence, Internet-based P2P
and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks communities. In fact, there
is not even a consistent definition of reputation itself, and,
closely linked, that of trust.
As a convention, following the Oxford English Dictionary,
we shall adopt that reputation is an estimate about a per-
son’s actual quality. Person is the appropriate term for so-
cial networks. In the context of computer networks we shall
replace it with user (of the system), node (in the network)
or simply a peer. Similarly, quality refers to the behaviour
that is of interest in a given context.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an overview
of reputation research in all the disciplines mentioned above.
In addition to computer science, we shall thus focus on
the social sciences, perhaps the most generic discipline for
the study of reputation. For the first time, we provide an
overview of the state-of-the-art in the different computer sci-
ence communities concerned with reputation as well as the
social sciences.
In particular, we will present results obtained from our math-
ematical model devised to investigate the impact of liars on
their peers’ reputation about a subject. The model can be
viewed as a generalization of the voter model [37], a well-
known interacting particle system in statistical physics. It
is appropriate both for communication networks and social
networks, although the results are viewed from a slightly
different point of view. We find that liars have no impact
unless their number exceeds a certain threshold, that is we
observe a phase transition behaviour. We give precise for-
mulae and quantify the impact, thereby providing insight
into social networks as well as facilitating performance eval-
uation and optimization of distributed reputation systems
in communication networks.
Historically oriented, the overview is organized according to
the almost separate evolution in the different communities
concerned with reputation. However, we put our model into
the context of related work in all the different communities
and argue for a more coherent terminology and approach.
We also argue that, while implementation details are crucial,
mathematical models should be considered as a means to
help answer questions of a more fundamental nature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We provide
background for self-organized communication systems and
motivate the use of reputation systems in Section 2. The
overview of the state-of-the-art in computer science can be
found in Section 3 and our mathematical model for liars’
impact on reputation is discussed in Section 4. We then turn
to related work on reputation in the social sciences (Section
5) and conclude by suggesting fundamental directions for
future research into reputation in Section 6.
2. SELF-ORGANIZED COMMUNICATION
SYSTEMS
There are many examples of P2P communication systems,
such as Internet-based P2P systems and Mobile Ad-Hoc
Networks. Other examples include Weblogs (or blogs), pod-
casting and Wikipedia1, although there is an element of
centralization, whereas we shall be concerned with fully dis-
tributed systems. We now look at Internet-based P2P sys-
tems and Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks in turn.
1http://wikipedia.org/
2.1 Internet-Based P2P Systems
In this context, P2P refers to systems in which the users
function simultaneously as both clients and servers to their
peers in the network. This differs from client/server (C/S)
architectures, in which some users are dedicated to serv-
ing the others. Each user is running software that im-
plements the same communication protocols and resource
sharing techniques. The current Internet being essentially
client/server, systems achieve the P2P organization in the
form of application-level overlay networks. A basic feature
is that users share local resources with their peers. Of-
ten, these are computer resources such as processing power,
cache or disk storage. However, services or information in
form of files are also shared.
In fact, the Internet itself was originally conceived as a P2P
network in that even though individual applications were of
C/S type, the user behaviour as a whole was entirely sym-
metric. Recently, however, P2P has been rediscovered as
an attractive paradigm for building distributed networked
applications. The popularity of file sharing systems like
Napster, Kazaa and more recently the BitTorrent protocol2
demonstrate the development (back) towards the symmetric
architecture of equal peers. In terms of usage and popular-
ity, [33] find that a significant proportion of Internet traffic
arises from P2P systems and that this is likely to increase
further in the future.
2.2 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks are composed of equal partici-
pants, the nodes, which communicate in a decentralized
fashion over wireless channels. Typically multi-hop rather
than direct communication between nodes is considered. For
example, the Terminode Project3 envisages a wireless net-
work of small personal devices owned by everyone in a wide
area [30].
Mobile Ad-Hoc Network are also organized according to the
P2P principle. They are autonomous (independent of any
infrastructure), self-organized and decentralized. Moreover,
there are additional issues of mobility, wireless links, lim-
ited battery power and the important resource shared is the
forwarding of packets.
2.3 Problems and Solution Approaches
While such self-organized systems have many important ad-
vantages such as scalability to potentially large number of
users, there are also problems.
In particular, in most applications users are individuals that
are primarily interested in their own benefit. As there is a
natural incentive for users to only consume, but not con-
tribute, cooperation and fairness cannot be guaranteed. In
Internet-based P2P networks, users might not want to pro-
vide bandwidth. In Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks, the users
might not want to provide their own limited battery to for-
ward other users’ packets. The ability to receive messages is
often not sufficient motivation to actively provide services.
Note that technical competence of the users is not a neces-
sity. If a company were to produces devices that did not
2http://bitconjurer.org/BitTorrent/protocol.html
3http://www.terminodes.org
cooperate and therefore had a longer runtime, that might
be attractive to customers.
This behaviour is called free-riding and is a well-known phe-
nomenon in economics. It often occurs in situations arising
in the context of public goods [18]. A public good is both
non-rivalrous, meaning that consumption by one does not
limit consumption by others, and non-exclusive, meaning
peers cannot be excluded from the benefits. In our case,
all users benefit from the service, however, without neces-
sarily contributing themselves. They free-ride in that they
increase their utility by taking more than their fair share
of the benefits or rather, by not shouldering their fair share
of the costs. The free-rider problem is that as a result this
service might not be provided at all or without sufficient
quality of service [53].
The free-rider problem often occurs in everyday life. For ex-
ample, consider air pollution, logging of forests, over-fishing
of the oceans or private vehicles jamming public roads. A
famous illustration of the free-rider problem is the Tragedy
of the Commons [27].
Effects can be detrimental. In Internet-based P2P networks,
for example, they have been illustrated in [3], [55] and [17].
The loss in social welfare achieved by such uncoordinated
individual utility maximizing behaviour compared to the so-
cial optimum is sometimes referred to as the price of anar-
chy. This term was originally introduced in the context of
delays in Internet flows [48], higher delay being bad, but
can easily be adapted to other metrics of interest. It is typ-
ically used in game theoretic models where it refers to the
ratio between the worst-case Nash equilibrium welfare and
the optimal social welfare [50].
Although altruistic behaviour has been observed, it is not
clear to which extent this will help in self-organized commu-
nication systems. Altruism is the practice of being helpful
to other people with little or no interest in being rewarded
for one’s efforts. The concept has a long history in philo-
sophical and ethical thought. For recent work on altruism
in Economics see [4] and [24]. Also see [47].
Thus, a number of mechanisms have been proposed, ranging
from incentive mechanism to reputation systems and artifi-
cial immune systems. They need to take into account both
the economic side and the engineering side. For example,
identity is an issue in all these systems [25, 23]. We shall
consider them in turn.
2.3.1 Incentive mechanisms
Incentive mechanisms are aimed at making it advantageous
for users to act in such a way that the resulting social welfare
is optimal [7].
The standard approach here is that of accounting schemes or
pricing mechanisms which have been applied successfully in
rate control in wireline networks, resource control in wireless
networks as well as in the wider context of communication
networks [19]. This might involve payments in kind or vir-
tual or real payments. For example, see [16] for a virtual
currency called nugglets and a nugglet counter. [21] suggest
a pricing scheme as used for Internet traffic based on no-
tional credit, all in the context of Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks.
[26] examine micropayment mechanisms in P2P file sharing
networks.
Pricing often leads to rather complex mechanisms. Thus,
rules are considered as an alternative [5]. That is, actions of
users are constrained locally by the software. Rules might
be more appropriate for simple symmetric P2P systems of
low cost resources. A simple example of a rule is to force
users to contribute in order to consume. Rules are used
by [20] in the context of P2P Wireless LAN Consortia. In-
centive mechanisms typically do not have an enforcement
component.
2.3.2 Reputation systems
Two other problems often incurred in P2P networks are ma-
licious attacks and random failures. Reputation systems ad-
dress both these issues as well as incentive problems. Here,
users keep track of their peers’ behaviour and exchange this
information with others in order to compute a reputation
value about their peers. Users with a good reputation are
then favoured.
Reputation systems have proven useful and are popular in
online auctioning systems such as eBay [58] or online book
stores such as Amazon and can be viewed as a substitute
for the word-of-mouth mechanisms in social networks. Cor-
respondingly, current research is concerned with investigat-
ing the use of fully distributed reputation systems in self-
organized communication systems. However, the distributed
nature leads to potentially very complex behaviour that
needs to be understood better. We will provide an overview
of the state-of-the-art in distributed reputation systems in
Section 3.
2.3.3 Artificial immune systems
More recently, artificial immune systems have begun to be
considered. They are aimed primarily at misbehaviour de-
tection and designed so that they adapt to normal behaviour,
but also recognize new misbehaviour patterns that had not
been anticipated in the system design phase [57]. Moreover,
artificial immune systems use mechanisms for faster detec-
tion of repeated misbehaviour [34, 54]. An important poten-
tial advantage of such systems is their inherent randomness
that provides diversity at the population level. Even if some
computers are vulnerable to an attack, there should be many
others that are resistant to the same attack. However, im-
plementations seem to depend very much on the particular
application and at the moment there does not appear to be
a working application in which an artificial immune system
has proved superior to other approaches.
3. REPUTATION SYSTEMS IN COMPUT-
ER SCIENCE
As seen in the previous section, using reputation systems is
a promising approach to incentive problems as well as mali-
cious attacks and random failures in self-organized computer
and communication systems. Indeed, a number of reputa-
tion systems have been proposed and we will now provide
an overview of the state-of-the-art.
Due to space restrictions, we shall focus on fully distributed
reputation systems in this paper. For reputation systems
relying on a centralized component, the reader is referred to
[49, 22, 38]. A typical application scenario for those reputa-
tion systems are online trading/online auction mechanisms
such as eBay.
In a fully distributed reputation system, users keep track
of their peers’ behaviour and exchange this information di-
rectly with others rather than with the help of some central-
ized entity. Each user merges their own first hand informa-
tion with the second hand information they receive in order
to compute a reputation value about each of their peers.
This might be an automated procedure. Users with a good
reputation are then favoured.
The advantage of a reputation system over merely using first
hand information is two-fold. Firstly, an accurate estimate
of some subject’s behaviour can be obtained faster. Sec-
ondly, a user can have a reputation value about a subject
without ever having interacted with it himself.
However, an inherent problem with any such mechanism is
the vulnerability to liars. Some user might have an interest
in spreading false information, so naively believing all second
hand information is problematic. Reputation values must
be accurate at least to some degree and thus robust against
liars.
Reputation systems have been considered, almost separately,
in different computer science communities. Although it is a
relatively recent area, research efforts have increased signifi-
cantly over the last few years. We will now consider artificial
intelligence, mobile-ad hoc and P2P literature in turn.
It should be noted that we organize our survey in this man-
ner, because historically, research has evolved this way, not
because we think it particularly suitable. In fact it is not.
A number of ideas have shown up in several communities,
but explicit links between them are rare. Sometimes there
are more links to other disciplines such as the social sciences
than to other communities within computer science. More-
over, the terminology is rather inconsistent. Often, there
are actually different concepts, but occasionally what some
authors call reputation, others call trust. Introducing our
model in Section 4, we link it with related work from all
these communities and argue that this is a more efficient
organization for reputation systems research (Section 6).
3.1 Artificial Intelligence Research
A review on reputation in computer science with a focus
on the artificial intelligence literature is given in [52]. It is
mainly concerned with implementations, as such does not
consider theoretical models.
In their terminology, reputation is one of the elements that
help to build trust. Reputation systems are classified ac-
cording to (A1) conceptual model, (A2) information sources
(direct experiences, witness information, sociological infor-
mation (A3) prejudice (conclusions drawn from group mem-
bership), (A4) visibility types, (A5) granularity, (A6) agent
behaviour assumption (honest, lie partially, lie and mecha-
nisms), (A7) type of exchanged information (discrete, con-
tinuous) and (A8) reliability measure. It is observed that us-
ing sociological information in (A2) about the links between
people (such as competition, collaboration) is not considered
by many systems. [51] uses this by employing sociograms,
that is, graphs representing relational data. Although, it is
difficult to construct the sociograms – and this is not dis-
cussed in the paper – the approach is to linking different
disciplines. Similarly, the prejudice information based on
group memberships has not been considered much.
Another review with a focus on online service provision is
given in [31]. To them, reputation is, somewhat loosely de-
fined, what is generally said or believed about a person’s
character or standing. (Reliability) trust is defined by the
subjective probability by which a person expects that a peer
performs a given action. They consider both centralized and
distributed reputation systems.
[62] and [59] also belong in this context. As they are related
to our model in Section 4, we discuss them there. For other
technical papers, the reader is referred to the references in
the reviews above.
3.2 P2P Systems Research
A number of reputation mechanisms have been suggested
and studied. A comprehensive survey and more detailed
overview of reputation systems suggested for Internet-base
P2P systems can be found in [2].
Here, trust is the extent to which a user trusts a peer behaves
well (cooperates) and reputation is the commonly shared be-
lieve how likely a peer behaves well (cooperates). They dis-
tinguish approaches according to (B1) social networks (by
which they mean graph theoretic models that consider tran-
sitivity of trust along the edges), (B2) probabilistic estima-
tion, (B3) game theoretic models (both classical and evolu-
tionary game theory).
[1] suggest a mechanism for P-Grid, a P2P system, that
spreads negative information only. The reader is referred
to [32] for the EigenTrust algorithm, a method to compute
global trust values in the presence of pre-trusted peers. An-
other mechanism is PeerTrust as introduced by [60]. Others
can be found in the references of the survey.
3.3 Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks Research
A number of reputation mechanisms have been suggested
and studied. A comprehensive survey and more detailed
overview of reputation systems suggested for Mobile Ad-
Hoc Networks can be found in [13]. Reputation systems
are classified according to (C1) representation of informa-
tion and classification, (C2) use of second-hand information,
(C3) trust and (C4) redemption and secondary response.
The CONFIDANT Protocol (Cooperation of Nodes, Fair-
ness In Dynamic Ad-hoc NeTworks) was proposed in [11].
Reputation is based on direct observations based on a neigh-
bourhood monitor as well as second hand information from
other nodes and are updated according to a Bayesian esti-
mation. In addition, there is a trust manager and a path
manager that implements the reaction by avoiding and iso-
lation misbehaving nodes. It is demonstrated that using
second-hand information can significantly accelerate the de-
tection and subsequent isolation of malicious nodes. The
robustness of the system against wrong accusations is also
considered [12].
The COllaborative REputation mechanism (CORE) was in-
troduced in [39] with a game theoretic analysis. Each node
of the network monitors the behaviour of its neighbours with
respect to a requested function and collects observations
about the execution of that function. Reputation takes into
account subjective observations, indirect reports from peers
and functional reputation that is task-specific. Based on
the collected observations, it computes a reputation value
for each neighbour. Selfish nodes are also avoided and ser-
vice denied.
OCEAN [9] and SORI [28] are also discussed in more details
in the survey. These systems have all been developed for
a fairly specific set of assumptions, in particular assuming
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [29].
4. MODELLING THE LIARS IMPACT
As described in the previous section, there is a tradeoff be-
tween speed and accuracy: the more second hand informa-
tion is used, the faster an estimate of some subject’s be-
haviour can be obtained, however, the more vulnerable it is
to liars. In order to be useful, reputation values need to be
accurate, at least to some degree, though. In this section, we
will present results obtained from our mathematical model
devised to investigate the impact of liars on their peers’ rep-
utation about a subject.
Our starting point is a simple and fully distributed idea to
address the problem of liars. We suppose, a user believes
second hand information if and only if it does not differ too
much from the user’s reputation value.
This idea, called the deviation test, was used as one compo-
nent in the reputation system [12] in the context of Mobile
Ad-Hoc Networks (cf. Section 3.3). The other, much more
complex component allows the use of second hand informa-
tion from trusted peers. To this end, each user maintains
both a reputation and a trust value about each of his peers.
As opposed to reputation, trust values are based on com-
patibility and thus indicate agreement. However, in simu-
lations the deviation test on its own was found to perform
surprisingly well. It seemed intriguing that such a simple
idea works so well and this motivated us to analyze it in
more detail and in a wider context.
We consider an abstract model of a reputation system in or-
der to address fundamental questions independently of the
details of implementation. As such, we are not concerned
with the detection and response components of a system,
but focus on the formation of reputation. The detection
component depends on the application scenario and we as-
sume that misbehaviour can be told apart from good be-
haviour. Moreover, we assume that if reputation values can
be computed accurately, than there exists a response mecha-
nism using them to obtain the desired effects. Typically, this
might mean exclusion of the misbehaving user from benefits.
In general, robustness against liars has not been analyzed
in depth, although some related work can be found in the
artificial intelligence community (cf. Section 3.1). [62] also
consider the problem of liars via some models of deception.
Their approach is based on the weighted majority technique
where the last second hand information is tested by com-
paring it to next direct interaction. The analysis is based
only on simulation. [59] is also concerned with filtering out
manipulated second hand information that seems unlikely.
However, they consider quantiles of the Beta distribution
rather than distance. This paper, too, is merely based on
simulation. In the context of centralized reputation systems,
[40] consider incentive mechanisms not to stimulate good be-
haviour in the network (cf. Section 2.3.1), but to stimulate
honest reports within the reputation system. The provide a
game theoretic analysis to show that honest reporting is a
Nash equilibrium.
The abstract nature of our model also makes it relevant in
a much wider context. One of them is social networks and
we will explain this as well as related work in Section 5.
One of the fundamental questions we address about the com-
parison of two different scenarios as regards to the second
hand information. In the first one, Reputation – based on all
previous observations including indirect ones – is passed on
as second hand information. In the second one, only Direct
Observations are passed on as second hand information.
In this paper, we only provide an overview. The reader is
referred to [45] and [44] for the analysis of the model for
two users, the former considering a one-dimensional sim-
plification. Together with [43], these cover self-organized
communication networks. For social networks and the gen-
eralization to a network of N people see [46]. Full details
and derivations can be found in [42].
We outline our methodology and summarize the modelling
assumptions in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we illustrate the
model using a typical simulation sample path. The main
results are summarized in Section 4.3.
4.1 Methodology
Our model is a stochastic process formulation based on a
number of assumptions. We suppose that there is a single
subject under consideration, behaving positively with and
negatively with probabilities θ and 1 − θ respectively, and
independently. Note that in our model reputation values of
several subjects do not interact, so the general case can be
decomposed into multiple instances of our model.
We suppose that there are Nh honest users and Nl liars in
the network and each user i has counters (xin, y
i
n) for posi-
tive and negative information respectively. The reputation
values are obtained as Rin = x
i
n/(x
i
n + y
i
n) in [0, 1], 1 being
positive and 0 being negative. Counters and correspond-
ing reputation values are updated with events in a Bayesian
fashion. However, whereas direct observations are always
accepted, second hand information is accepted by a user
only if considered likely, i.e. only if it does not differ by
more than a threshold ∆ from the user’s current reputation
value. Even if accepted, it is weighted by a factor ωweight.
Moreover, we include discounting with a factor ρ, so that
old observations gradually become less important. Liars
are assumed to naively report extremely negative reputa-
tion values and observations respectively. The positive case
is similar by symmetry.
Interactions are assumed to happen symmetrically according
to a Poisson process framework. Thus, a given interaction is
a direct observation with probability p, indirect from a liar
with probability q and from an honest peer with probability
r = 1−p−q where these probabilities depend on the number
of liars in the network.
The stochastic process formulation can be viewed as a gen-
eralization of the well known voter model [37]. With ρ = 0,
ω = ∆ = 1, p = q = 0, r = 1 and initial value (xi0, y
i
0)
either (1, 0) or (0, 1) for all i, we recover the voter model on
a complete graph.
From the stochastic process formulation, we derive an or-
dinary differential equation by averaging the dynamics and
passing to a fast-time scaling limit. That is, we scale time
so that events occur more frequently, i.e. users make obser-
vations at a higher rate, but at the same time the impact of
each observation is reduced by the same factor. We then de-
rive the solutions of the differential equation and study their
fixed points. Thus, our approach can be called a mean-field
approach [61]. Moreover, we use simulation and direct com-
putation to confirm the analytical results.
4.2 Typical Sample Path
For better illustration, we show a typical sample path ob-
tained from the simulations with parameter set 1 in Figure
4.2. It is obtained in the scenario where Direct Observations
only are passed on as second hand information.
Parameter set 1. θ = 0.8, p = 0.2, q = 0.6, r = 0.2,
ω = 0.75, Nh = 100, i.e. Nl = (Nh − 1)q/r = 297 liars,
ρ = 0.995 and initial values R0 = 0. ∆ = 0.32. We carry
out 80000Nh steps. Thus, the fixed points obtained from
analysis are R∗true = 0.8 and R
∗
false = 0.2, but, here, not
R∗inter (Direct Observations).
The upper and lower boundaries in the plot correspond to
reputation values 1 and 0. The intermediate lines corre-
spond to fixed point reputation values R∗true, R
∗
inter and
R∗false. Two kinds of average reputation values are plot-
ted in black and grey, two individual reputation values of
two users are plotted in blue and yellow. The individual
reputation values increase and settle down at R∗false before
increasing further, one by one, past R∗inter and settling down
at R∗true. This confirms existence as well as the values of the
fixed points R∗false and R
∗
true.
4.3 Main Results
Amain result is that, in order to have an impact, the number
of liarsNl in the network needs to exceed a certain threshold.
That is, there is a phase transition behaviour. Alternatively,
this can be phrased in terms of the parameter ∆ rather than
in terms of Nl. If ∆ is below a certain threshold, the liars
have no impact.
We provide precise formulae for these critical values and
quantify the impact. We find that Reputation and Direct
Figure 1: Typical graph of reputation plotted vs.
time obtained from a simulation of parameter set
1. The upper and lower boundaries in the plot cor-
respond to reputation values 1 and 0. The inter-
mediate lines correspond to fixed point reputation
values R∗true, R
∗
inter and R
∗
false. Two kinds of average
reputation values are plotted in black and grey, two
individual reputation values of two users are plotted
in blue and yellow. The individual reputation values
increase and settle down at R∗false before increasing
further, one by one, past R∗inter and settling down at
R∗true. This confirms existence as well as the values
of the fixed points R∗false and R
∗
true (Direct Observa-
tions).
Observations coincide if and only if θ > 2∆. For Reputa-
tion, second hand information does not improve accuracy,
whereas for Direct Observations it does. We quantify this
difference.
In the context of communication networks we can use our
results to give guidelines for a good choice of parameters
and hence system design. For example, for maximal gains
in terms of speed and without compromising on accuracy,
the system parameter ∆ should be chosen as the threshold.
More specifically, a typical result is of the following form
(Reputation).
Theorem 1. Consider the scenario where Reputation is
passed on as second hand information.
If ∆ < ∆c1 = (pθ)/(p+ qω),
(x, y) =
1
(1− rω)(1− ρ)
(pθ, p(1− θ)) (1)
is the unique fixed point of the mean ODE. It is asymp-
totically stable and all trajectories are attracted to it. The
corresponding reputation value is
R∗true = θ. (2)
If ∆c1 ≤ ∆ < ∆c4 = θ there is a second, false fixed point
(x, y) =
1
(1− rω)(1− ρ)
(pθ, p(1− θ) + qω) . (3)
Both are asymptotically stable, attracting trajectories from
x(t)/(x(t) + y(t)) > ∆ and x(t)/(x(t) + y(t)) ≤ ∆ respec-
tively. The corresponding reputation value is
R∗false = θp/(p+ ωq). (4)
If ∆c4 ≤ ∆, then only the latter, false one is asymptotically
stable and all trajectories are attracted to it.
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Figure 2: Bifurcation plot in terms of ∆: As ∆
increases from 0 to 1 the number of fixed points
changes. The case with Reputation is shown in blue,
the case with Direct Observations is shown in black.
Reputation: depending on the parameters, up to 2
fixed points, 2 critical values. Direct Observations:
depending on the parameters, up to 3 possible fixed
points, 4 critical values.
For Direct Observations, the corresponding result is slightly
more complicated. We compare the two in Figure 4.3. As
∆ increases from 0 to 1 the number of fixed points changes.
The case with Reputation is shown in blue, the case with
Direct Observations is shown in black. For Reputation, de-
pending on the parameters, there are up to 2 fixed points
and 2 critical values. For Direct Observations, depending on
the parameters, there are up to 3 possible fixed points and
4 critical values.
So far, we have assumed independent subject behaviour. It
will be interesting to consider the case when direct observa-
tions are correlated.
Another extension is to consider strategic lying, that is liars
attempting something more subtle than simply telling ex-
treme lies. For example, they could lie in some proportion
of reports only or they could always report intermediate be-
haviour in an attempt to conceal their lies.
It will also be interesting to extend our results from the
symmetric situation we have considered thus far to an asym-
metric situation. In many social networks, people are not
symmetric in terms of their interactions. Lai and Wong [36],
for example, have examined the tie effect on information dis-
semination in the context of rumour spreading. They find
that information transmitted via kin ties tends to arrive at
the respondent faster than via non-kin ties or other commu-
nication channels. We turn to social networks in the next
section.
5. REPUTATION RESEARCH IN THE SO-
CIAL SCIENCES
Social network analysis [56] is concerned with relationships
of individuals in a society. The concept of reputation in
social networks is a natural one and we experience it in
everyday life.
Let us consider a dense, closed social network. By this we
mean that everyone in it is connected to everyone else by
similarly strong relationships. People in the network are as-
sumed to take an interest in the behaviour of some subject
which can be either positive or negative. They interact with
this subject directly. They also interact with each other,
e.g. in conversations, and thereby pass on their own experi-
ences with the subject to their peers. Based on both direct
experience and indirect information they form their reputa-
tion about the subject. An example is the social network
of truck drivers interested in the quality of food of a high-
way restaurant. Alternatively, the subject might be part of
the social network itself and there might be more than one
subject. This is the case when people in the network gossip
about each other.
Sharing experiences with one’s peers serves the purpose of
using information more efficiently: By also considering other
people’s experiences, one is able to get a more accurate
idea about the actual subject behaviour faster. However,
it might be the case that not every person in the social net-
work passes on their experiences with the subject truthfully.
There might be liars with an interest in manipulating their
peers’ reputation about the subject. In the absence of trust,
these might distort the overall reputation of the subject in
the network.
So the question arises whether second hand information is
or should always be believed. We assume that this is not so.
Rather, if a person is confronted with information that is not
verifiable, they will probably believe it only if, to them, it
seems likely. However, they will ignore it if, to them, it seems
unlikely. Moreover, they will not necessarily attach the same
weight to an experience reported by a peer compared to
their own direct experiences. We also assume that people
gradually forget experiences they have made a long time ago
and that in the current reputation about the subject recent
experiences are given greater impact as a result.
Then we recover our stochastic model from the previous
section. There is the subject under consideration, behav-
ing positively with and negatively with probabilities θ and
1 − θ respectively, and independently. There are Nh hon-
est people and Nl liars in the network and their opinion is
represented by reputation values Rin in [0, 1], changing with
new experiences. The threshold parameter distinguishing
between likely and unlikely reports is ∆ and the weighting
parameter is ωweight, forgetting is accounted for via the dis-
counting factor ρ. Again, the Poisson process framework
with parameters p, q, and r = 1− p− q is a natural one to
start with.
As in the communication networks context, the results tell
us about the phase transition in the social networks context.
Unless the number of liars exceeds a threshold, they do not
have any impact on their peers reputation about the subject.
Moreover, we find how much better it would be, if everyone
only passed on their own direct experience rather than gos-
siping. In the context of social networks it is not that we
are interested in optimizing a system parameter. Rather,
we predict reputation given certain assumptions about peo-
ple’s behaviour, thereby offering social scientist a different
approach to study reputation in social networks.
Similar questions have also been studied in the social sci-
ences. [41], for example, examine to what extent foes dete-
riorate a person’s labour market position.
[15] investigates how the competitive advantage known as
social capital depends on the structure of the social network.
He also focuses on closed networks rather than networks of
interdependent groups (brokerage, cf. also [14]) and evalu-
ates two competing hypotheses. Firstly, the so-called band-
width hypothesis that network closure enhances information
flow. This is found in closure models of social capital and
as well as in reputation models in economics. Secondly, the
so-called echo hypothesis that closure models merely create
an echo that reinforces predispositions and leads to ignorant
certainty. This is found in the social psychology of selective
disclosure. Evidence considered in the literature as well as
in [15] supports echo over bandwidth. Bandwidth and echo
models represent a fundamental choice for theoretical mod-
els of trust. The lying in our model can be interpreted as
selective disclosure in this context. It can be seen that pass-
ing on reputation as second hand information more likely
creates an echo scenario. Passing on only direct experience
more likely creates a bandwidth scenario.
In general, work in social sciences is more about data col-
lection and interpretation than about modelling, although
there are some. [10], for example, model interpersonal rela-
tionships using algebraic semigroups.
Another social phenomenon is that of herd behaviour. It
has been considered in scenarios as diverse as voters be-
haviour at elections, fertility choices, technology decisions
or hot topics in research. An economic approach is provided
in [8]. The author analyzes a game theoretic model in which
each decision maker looks at decisions made by previous de-
cision makers in taking her own decision. The aim of the
game for each player is to find the correct option. The fact
that other players’ influence is very strong, somewhat limits
the applicability of the model.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL
DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
In this paper, we have motivated the importance of repu-
tation for self-organized communication systems and pro-
vided a survey of distributed reputation system research
in the various communities within computer science. We
have also pointed at reputation research in the many disci-
plines outside computer science, focusing in particular on the
social sciences. Moreover, we have presented results from
our mathematical model addressing fundamental questions
about the liars’ impact on reputation.
It has become apparent that both definition and representa-
tion of reputation vary widely even within computer science.
While it is debatable whether or not the same definition and
representation should be used for all applications, a more co-
herent terminology would certainly be desirable. Moreover,
it would be useful to have a coherent classification of reputa-
tion systems. Criteria (A1–8), (B1–3) and (C1–4) from the
artificial intelligence, Internet-based P2P and Mobile Ad-
Hoc Networks communities respectively (cf. Sections 3.1,
3.2 and 3.3) are relevant in all communities and could easily
be combined into a more complete classification.
Based on a more coherent terminology, it would also be de-
sirable to bring together the different strands of research,
within computer science, but also between disciplines. This
would avoid lots of reinventing the wheel that can be ob-
served at the moment. The reputations research network4
went only some way towards this. In this paper, we have
attempted to at least provide pointers to work on reputa-
tion in the different computer science communities as well
as in social network analysis. A number of interesting ex-
amples of the successful combination of different disciplines
(physics, economics, social sciences) can be found in [6].
Clearly, specific applications for distributed reputation sys-
tems are of crucial importance and many papers address
various scenarios. However, it is also important not to get
lost in the details. There are fundamental questions that are
important in all these scenarios that should be addressed on
a suitable level of abstraction. For example, the difference
between passing on Reputation as opposed to Direct Obser-
vations falls into this category.
Finally, computer science research is often based on sim-
ulations, measurements or implementation and testing of
prototypes. For example, prototype protocols are typically
evaluated using a network simulator such as ns-25 or Glo-
MoSim6. Apart from game and graph theoretic investiga-
tions (cf. Section 3), there are comparatively few analytical
studies although they often provide insight that is hard to
obtain otherwise. An example of this is the stochastic pro-
cess formulation of the model discussed in Section 4. Even
though results are typically proven to be valid under clearly
defined assumptions, some of which might be unrealistic,
it is often the case that results are valid at least qualita-
tively even if the assumptions are violated. In the social
sciences context in particular, such approaches are rare al-
though it would be desirable to enhance predictive capa-
bilities of social networks. Moreover, there might yet be
other approaches (than game theoretic, graph theoretic and
stochastic models) that have not been considered so far.
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